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Abstract
Hardware-assisted trusted execution environments
(TEEs) are critical building blocks of many modern
applications. However, the one-way isolation model
introduces a semantic gap between TEE and its outside
world, including conventional OSs and applications.
This causes the most practical and ever-increasing set
of attacks on TEE-enabled applications by exploiting
various insecure interactions with the host OS and
applications. Complex applications rely on many
mechanisms on the host OS and TEE system; their
complex interactions open a large attack surface that
threatens both the trusted and normal worlds. To address
this fundamental issue, we introduce Sirius, the first
OS and TEE system to achieve system-wide isolation
in TEEs. It enables fine-grained compartmentalization,
strong isolation, and secure interactions between
enclaves and kernel objects (e.g., threads, address
spaces, IPC, files, and sockets). Sirius replaces ad-hoc
and inefficient forms of interactions in current TEE
systems with a principled approach that adds strong inter-
and intra-process isolation and efficiently eliminates
a wide range of attacks. We evaluate Sirius on ARM
platforms, and find that it is lightweight (≈ 15K LoC)
and only adds ≈ 10.8% overhead to enable TEE
support on applications such as httpd, and improves the
performance of existing TEE-enabled applications such
as the Darknet ML framework and ARM’s LibDDSSec
by 0.05%−5.6%.
1 Introduction
Hardware-assisted trusted computing primitives such as
ARM TrustZone [12], Intel SGX [23], AMD SEV [49]
or Keystone [39] exist to establish strong security guar-
antees even in the presence of malicious privileged code.
These trusted execution environments (TEEs)1 assume
a threat model in which only the CPU itself is trusted,
not the host applications and OS. Therefore, the ideal
in-enclave codebase should be small and verifiable with
minimal interaction with the outside world [27].
However, in practice, TEEs are used in much more
complex applications; secure payment [1, 10, 11, 67],
databases [55], DRM [56], autonomous vehicle con-
trol [2], and privacy-preserving machine learning [31, 33,
34, 51, 59, 69]. These applications require bidirectional
interfaces to enclaves (e.g., shared memory or RPC) and
rely on the underlying untrusted system to interact with
the external environment. But, existing OSs and TEE
systems offer weak security guarantees and expect devel-
opers to guard all interaction layers. Hence, we observe
severe attacks arising from ad-hoc security models for
hosting enclaves on conventional OSs.
Previous studies [35, 44, 61, 62, 68, 73, 79, 80] show a
wide range of attacks (with and without root) on all pri-
mary TEE systems [23,24,30,39]. For example, attackers
take advantage of inadequate isolation in the shared ad-
dress space between an enclave and its host application
(see Figure 1¬). They can compromise host applications
via horizontal privilege escalation (HPE) attacks [68],
launch ROP attacks [17,40] to extract cryptography keys
and bypass remote attestation, or use BOOMERANG
attacks [44] to gain control of the host OS by tricking
the secure world into modifying host kernel memory. At-
tackers can also launch malicious threads inside the host
application process to exploit synchronization vulnerabil-
ities such as TOCTTOU [78,79] or other type of COIN at-
tacks [35] on enclave interfaces(Figure 1­). This greatly
limits the secure use of enclaves in a multi-threaded ap-
plication. All these attacks are possible because of the
underlying weak security model for sharing, unguarded
1For simplicity, we use the terms TEE and enclave interchangeably.
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Figure 1: Security threats against existing TEE systems
shared kernel objects (e.g., address space, files, sockets),
insecure threading and concurrent calls, and untrusted
IPC/RPC interfaces.
Previous work focuses on reducing untrusted interac-
tions between two worlds via in-enclave LibOSs [13,
15, 54, 70] that port unmodified applications entirely to
enclaves via wrappers around the necessary host ker-
nel system calls. For example, SGX-LKL [54] ports a
large part of the Linux kernel into the enclave and pro-
vides encrypted communication channels. However, this
approach has a high overhead, limited compatibility for
complex applications, and does not protect the host kernel
from the enclave. Compromised or malicious third-party
enclaves can collect and leak sensitive data about the
user and host system [45, 61] and transfer them through
OS standard abstractions such as files or network sockets
(Figure 1 ®¯). Existing OSs and TEE systems offer no
comprehensive protection against such attacks.
We present Sirius – a new set of kernel extensions and
a TEE system – as a principled approach for mitigat-
ing these attacks in general-purpose OSs by supporting
secure sharing, system-wide isolation, and fine-grained
privilege separation. We aim to provide necessary ab-
stractions for defenses layers to protect enclaves on one
side and the host applications and OS on the other side.
To build such a system, we need (i) a coherent secu-
rity model based on mutual distrust; (ii) identifying the
right abstractions to enforce fine-grained, efficient, intra-
process privilege separation; and (iii) a new program-
ming model for TEE-assisted applications to define fine-
grained trust boundaries.
Since the host environment and TEE worlds have their
own security requirements and software stack, extending
centralized security models such as MACs [9], system
call filtering [8], or namespaces only allows static coarse-
grained security policies. We introduce a new security
model – dubbed system-wide isolation in TEE-systems
(SWIT) – that is inspired by decentralised information
flow control (DIFC) [50]. Unlike classic IFC [25], DIFC
allows every security principal to define trust boundaries
via a set of labels drawn from a partially ordered set and
allows communication if the labels satisfy an ordering.
SWIT extends DIFC principles to work with TEE sys-
tems via: (i) low-overhead thread-granular enforcement
of labels within fundamental kernel objects; (ii) isolation
across multiple untrusting kernels on the same host; and
(iii) secure label management and storage.
Sirius is the first system that comprehensively imple-
ments SWIT in a general purpose OS. Our new kernel
extensions prove that it is possible to enforce fine-grained,
strong security guarantees with reasonable overhead. The
Sirius TEE programming model hides the complex de-
tails of the underlying information flow control enforce-
ment from developers. It enables TEE hardware to guard
complex multi-threaded use cases like the Apache web-
server, the Darknet ML framework, and safety-critical
applications such as autonomous vehicles or medical de-
vices that rely on secure data distribution services. In
summary, our contributions are:
• A new security model (§2): we introduce system-
wide isolation in TEE-systems (SWIT) to enable
fine-grained compartmentalisation and strong isola-
tion at the inter- and intra-process levels.
• A new architecture and programming model (§3):
we present the first kernel extensions across trusted
and untrusted worlds that achieve SWIT within ker-
nel objects like threads, address spaces, RPC, files,
sockets, and pipes. Our APIs enable TEE-assisted
applications to define thread-granular compartmen-
talisation with hierarchical trust relationships.
• Implementation and evaluation (§4, §5): we proto-
type Sirius on ARMv7-A platforms by modifying
the Linux kernel and the popular TrustZone-based
TEE system, OPTEE. Then, we evaluate it via mi-
crobenchmarks and real-world TEE-assisted appli-
cations, and show that it is efficient even for embed-
ded devices with just a few megabytes of memory.
2 Overview
2.1 Threat Model
Sirius targets numerous userspace attacks caused by in-
secure interactions between enclaves and primary kernel
objects (Figure 1). It assumes a userspace attacker, who
can gain full control of a thread inside the host appli-
cation, use OS services, memory operations, and spawn
more threads up to the resource limits. The attacker tries
to interfere with the interactions of other threads and
associated enclaves via crafted RPC requests, concur-
rent calls, shared memory access, or other process re-
sources [35, 79]. She attempts to launch various attacks
using the shared address space to extract other thread’s
secrets or to gain full control of the host OS [17, 40, 44].
We also assume that it bypasses address space random-
ization techniques [63] by targeting the non-randomized
runtime that handles transitions between the two worlds.
These attack models are not mutually exclusive. They
can be combined together to exploit more vulnerabilities.
We also consider an attacker who can launch a malicious
enclave or take control of a vulnerable enclave. The pre-
vious scenarios are also valid in this case. The attackers
from both secure and normal worlds try to leak secrets
through untrusted threads and other kernel objects such
as files, network sockets, or IPC.
Sirius considers each userspace thread and enclave
thread to be a security principle and enables them to
define a wide range of security policies based on mu-
tual distrust. We enforce each thread’s security policy
to protect its secrets against unauthorized, accidental,
and malicious access or disclosure. Therefore, the TCB
consists of the host OS, TEE kernel and a security mon-
itor, which perform this enforcement. It also assumes
application developers correctly specify their policies
through the Sirius userspace API. This work does not
target microarchitectural covert or side-channel attacks
[21, 36, 41, 60, 66, 72, 83, 86].
2.2 Information Flow Control for TEEs
Our security model, system-wide isolation in TEEs
(SWIT), mitigates the many attacks against enclaves. We
aim to enable threads, running on both normal and se-
cure world kernels, to define trust boundaries over their
resources (Figure 2). SWIT controls how information
flows between threads on different kernels on the same
host to ensure that only threads that should communi-
cate can do so. It enables both kernels to collaborate
for enforcing fine-grained compartmentalization across
both worlds while providing an extra layer of defense for
shared objects via a security monitor.
Security policies in SWIT are specified with secrecy
and integrity tags, labels, and privilege capabilities. A
tag has no inherent meaning, and a label is a set of tags.
Privileges are represented in form of two capabilities
θ+ and θ− per tag θ, that are stored in each thread’s
capability list Ct = C+t ∪C−t (θ+ ∈ C+t and θ− ∈ C−t ).
These capabilities enable adding or removing tags to
or from labels (similar to Flume [38]). Therefore, each
thread t, has also secrecy (St) and integrity (It) labels,
and a set Dt ⊆Ct that stores all tags for which t has both
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Figure 2: Architecture of SWIT in Sirius
privileges (full control). The normal kernel creates and
stores all these lists for its own object, while the security
monitor does the same for enclave-related objects. All
label operations are done internally within the kernels;
each kernel allows secrecy information flow from α to
β only if Sα ⊆ Sβ, and allows integrity information flow
if Iβ ⊆ Iα. Unsafe operations such as declassification
(removing a tag from a secrecy label) and endorsement
(adding a tag to an integrity label) require the thread to
be an owner or an authority (an acts-for relation [22]).
Enabling SWIT should not lead to new security threats,
make the system too restrictive, or make it hard for devel-
opers to correctly define their security policies. It should
not add large overhead to TEE systems that already fea-
ture expensive communications [81]. For example, hard-
ening M:N threading across an application and enclave
(e.g., our machine learning example in §5.2.2) should
not lead to large labels and slow label propagation. Since
shared objects between the two worlds are the most vul-
nerable parts of our threat model, no single kernel should
be allowed to do unsafe operations on them (e.g., declas-
sification and endorsement). Similarly, no thread should
be able to manipulate persistent labels after a restart.
Requirements: To enable SWIT in a general-purpose
OS we assume the presence of: (i) TEE hardware to
isolate enclaves’ execution; (ii) a security monitor (SM)
at a high privilege level to handle interactions between
the two worlds; and (iii) secure persistent storage for
enclave-related labels.
Widespread TEE hardware includes ARM TrustZone
(TZ), Intel SGX, and AMD SEV. This paper focuses on
TZ; however, our design is portable to x86 with straight-
forward engineering, where the security monitor can be
emulated via the host hypervisor or a dedicated SGX en-
clave. We chose TZ for our prototype since its secure
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Figure 3: High-level architecture of Sirius-protected applications
world is more powerful than SGX enclaves, so exploited
enclaves can lead to a full OS compromise. TZ does
not directly support attestation as SGX does [23], which
increases the possibility of hosting malicious enclaves.
Also, billions of embedded devices use TZ-based TEEs,
which requires enabling SWIT to be resource-efficient
and not introduce the high overhead of a combination of
techniques in compilers, sandboxing, and access control
that previous x86-based TEE solutions have adopted.
For secure storage, we rely on the SM to encrypt a
persistent storage area in its boot file system using a
secure storage key (SSK), enclave storage key (ESK),
and file encryption key (FEK). The per-device SSK is
generated as a function of the unique hardware key and
chip ID. The SSK must be stored in secure DRAM that
is not accessible by the normal world, and will be used
to derive the ESK.
3 Sirius Design and API
Sirius allows application developers to partition their
code into multiple trusted components that would be exe-
cuted inside enclaves. Normal world userspace threads
launch these enclaves, and Sirius isolates all layers of
interaction between those threads and enclaves by con-
trolling the information flow across their kernel objects
(RPC, shared memory, or other kernel objects). Before
explaining the details of Sirius’s design, we illustrate
at a high-level how Sirius establishes SWIT in Apache
webserver (in Figure 3a).
Partitioning: The developer uses Sirius APIs to define
two enclaves; an OpenSSL enclave to run cryptographic
operations and a storage enclave to store private keys and
certificates. The developer then defines the enclaves’ in-
terfaces via a manifest. The build-system cross-compiles
the manifest into separate executable enclave binaries and
generates UUIDs for each based on the executable hash.
This build generates per-enclave security keys, which are
persistently stored by the SM.
Compartmentalization: The webserver needs to en-
force mutual distrust between the OpenSSL enclave and
the normal world. The enclave only needs access to the
information required to establish a session key and no
other user data. Sirius provides a new isolated memory
compartment (IMC) API that enables thread-granularity
shared memory protection between the webserver and
enclave. Once the OpenSSL EVP code is modified to use
this malloc-style memory allocator (§3.2), authorized
threads in both worlds gain the convenience and perfor-
mance of a shared-memory programming model that is
only accessible by a subset of threads. Sirius also labels
the private keys files for the TLS negotiations to not be
accessible to webserver threads.
Enforcement: When the webserver starts, a single nor-
mal world thread can now launch the OpenSSL and stor-
age enclaves and only that thread has the right label to
interact with theses enclaves. The secure kernel loads
each enclave binary from the normal world into its ded-
icated address space in SEL0, similar to launching pro-
cesses on Linux. The normal world thread then grants
the OpenSSL enclave direct RPC access to the storage
enclave, and proceeds to revoke its own access to the stor-
age enclave. The normal world thread has now dropped
its privileges and the storage enclave can only commu-
nicate with the OpenSSL enclave or its own encrypted
filesystem.
The webserver uses a thread pool to handle incoming
requests. The Sirius version can simply launch the same
number of threads within the normal world (to handle
external connections) and the OpenSSL enclave (to gener-
ate TLS session keys), and dynamically register memory
regions so that the worker thread for a given connection
only has access to its own session key. If a connection
is compromised, that thread has no privileges to do any-
thing beyond reading the one session key. If an enclave
thread is compromised, it cannot leak its secrets to the
outside world or access user data from the webserver.
We next explain the Sirius enclave lifecycle (§3.1) and
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Figure 4: Examples of information flow control in Sirius enclaves
our memory compartmentalization mechanisms (§3.2).
We do not describe the partitioning toolchain further, as
it is largely consists of build system concerns.
3.1 Sirius Enclave Lifecycle
In Sirius, the security monitor (SM) runs in the high-
est privilege level (EL3). The normal kernel (NK) and
secure kernel (SK) run in EL1 and SEL1. The appli-
cation threads run in userspace processes in EL0 and
enclave threads in SEL0. A normal world thread p calls
s_create_enclave to spawn an enclave (see Table 1 for
the interface). The NK creates a random secrecy-tag x
and adds it to the thread’s secrecy label Sp and ownership
list Dp. The NK then transfers the message to the SM via
an SMC call (Figure 4 ¬a). The SM creates and persis-
tently stores a new tag y for the enclave and notifies the
SK to assign both tags to a new enclave userspace thread
e, by updating its empty labels to Se{x,y} and De{y}.
The SM enforces message safety from p to enclave e by
checking that Sp−Dp ⊆ Se∪De∧ Ie−De ⊆ Ip∪Dp. The
SM passes the y+ capability to the NK for updating Sp
to enable bidirectional calls (Figure 4 ¬b).
Both threads have each other’s secrecy-tags but with
only the plus capability. The SM is the only authority for
declassifying (via s_declassify) an enclave tag as well
as all shared objects between the two worlds. The SM
checks the safety of all RPC requests between the two
worlds. It ensures that no unauthorized thread can jump to
an enclave entry. The SM drops unauthorized messages,
and the NK kills the violating thread (Figure 4 ­).
Each thread can grant privileges to another thread via
s_grant, and revoke previously delegated privileges by
calling s_revoke. The owner thread can also restrict
any access or modifications of its object state by calling
s_access_disable, which alters the object’s tag tem-
porarily until s_access_enable is called by the thread.
This is a useful additional intra-process defense layer
when adapting untrusted code or libraries. Child threads
do not inherit labels by default (e.g., in the style of fork)
as this makes it difficult to reason about security [14]. The
parent thread can explicitly create a child with specified
labels as an argument of s_clone.
Each normal thread can also use conventional Linux
syscalls to access resources such as files, sockets, or pipes.
We extend some syscalls such as open with extra flags
(SLABEL/ILABEL) to create a labeled file, as are in clone,
create and pipe. Once labeled, Sirius controls the infor-
mation flow within all operations on them via extended
kernel abstractions (4.1.4). The other substantial new
feature in Sirius is the intra-process memory compart-
mentalization, described next.
3.2 Address Space Compartmentalisation
Our SWIT security model requires intra-process memory
protection that is not provided in POSIX-based OSs. We
designed a new memory compartmentalization abstrac-
tion (MCA) to efficiently overcome this limitation. It
introduces isolated memory compartments (IMCs) and
enforces IFC on these new address space objects to iso-
late them across threads in the same address space.
We introduce vdom as a contiguous segment of virtual
memory (VM). Any virtual address can only belong to
one vdom, and threads can create one or multiple vdoms
using vdom_create. Each thread creates one or more
IMCs (via imc_create), and the kernel assigns a new se-
crecy label to each. This enables different threads to have
different privileges assigned for a shared vdom. When
a thread has the θ+ capability for IMC θ, it gains the
privilege to access the IMC’s vdoms with the permis-
sion set by the IMC owner via imc_grant. Having the
declassification capability allows the thread to modify
the attached vdoms memory layout by adding/removing
pages via vdom_mmap/munmap, change IMC permissions
via vdom_mprotect, or transfer the content to untrusted
sources (e.g., copy to a file, or share with other thread).
Figure 4 ® shows how both enclave e and thread p
have access (m ∈ Se ∧m ∈ Sp) to the shared IMC with
two vdoms, M1 and M2. Since the enclave is the owner
Common enclave operations:
s_create_enclave → eid create an enclave
s_ecall (rpc_msg *, arguments) call from the host thread to the enclave
s_ocall (rpc_msg *, arguments) call from the enclave to the host thread
s_delete_enclave(eid) delete an enclave
Common security policy syscalls :
s_grant/revoke (label_info *, tid, dir) give/revoke thread privileges to objects
s_access_enable/disable (label_info *) enable/disables access to set of objects
s_clone (label_info *,...) → tid create a labeled child
open/socket/pipe(label_info *,...) → ret create a labeled kernel object
API for Intra-process memory isolation:
imc_create(hw-mode-flags) → imc_id create a new IMC (kernel- or hardware-backed)
imc_grant/revoke(imc_id,vdom_id, P) grants/revoke IMC the capability to vdom with priv P
vdom_create(void) → vdom_id create a vdom
vdom_malloc/free(vdom_id, ...) allocate/deallocate memory within an vdom
vdom_mprotect/mmap/munmap(vdom_id,...) add/remove pages or change its permission
imc_kill(imc_id) cleanup an IMC
Table 1: Summary of the Sirius application interface
(m ∈ De), p can only access the vdoms with default per-
missions and cannot modify the default state. The kernel
restricts any unauthorized transfer of IMC vdoms via
memcpy, mmap, or other unauthorized channels such as
files, or pipes. The SM and NK protect vdoms against
any unauthorized operations from both worlds’ threads
in SEL0 and EL0.
The code below shows how two threads can have dif-
ferent privileges over a shared vdom. s_clone creates a
labeled thread and maps IMCs into it.
// initialization ....
vdom_id = vdom_create ();
imc_id [1] = imc_create(DEFAULT);
imc_id [2] = imc_create(DEFAULT);
// map same vdom with different permissions
imc_grant(imc_id [1], vdom_id ,
MEMDOM_READ | MEMDOM_WRITE);
imc_grant(imc_id [2], vdom_id , MEMDOM_READ );
// map imcs to threads
tid1 = s_clone(imc_id [1],&fn ,..., SLABEL|flags);
tid2 = s_clone(imc_id [2],..., SLABEL|flags);
//the rest ....}
The next code snippet uses the MCA for memory pro-
tection within a single thread.
// initialization ....
vdom_id = vdom_create ();
imc_id = imc_create(DEFAULT);
imc_grant(imc_id , vdom_id ,
MEMDOM_READ | MEMDOM_WRITE);
/* allocate memory from vdom */
private_blk = (char*) vdom_malloc(vdom_id , len);
/* make imc inaccessible */
s_access_disable(imc ,imc_id);
//... untrusted computations ....//
/* make imc accessible */
s_access_enable(imc ,imc_id);
//... trusted computations ....//
/* cleanup imc */
vdom_free(private_blk);
imc_kill(imc_id);
//the rest ....}
The application uses vdom_malloc call to allocate con-
tiguous memory blocks within the vdom, vdom_free to
deallocate memory, or vdom_mprotect to change its per-
missions. The thread has fine-grained control over its
IMCs and can even protect them against its own un-
trusted code (e.g., unsafe third-party libraries) through
the s_access_enable/disable calls. The SM checks
all the operations of an IMC that are shared or owned by
an enclave thread. The NK does the same for enclave-
independent IMCs, so applications can shield their se-
crets even from their enclave. Using s_access_disable
restricts any IMC access or modification by accident or
via malicious code; this is helpful for attacks inside a
single thread. We later show how all these MCA features
help to harden libraries such as OpenSSL with minimal
in-enclave code (96% reduced enclave code) as an alter-
native to running it entirely inside an enclave (§5.2.1).
4 Implementation
Sirius builds the SWIT security model into the Linux
kernel (§4.1) instead of userspace to minimise the TCB
and avoid large overheads [38]. The secure world stack
is implemented by extending OP-TEE (§4.2).
4.1 Normal world kernel
Sirius adds a new security module in the Linux kernel
(version 4.19.42) to govern information flows through
fundamental kernel abstractions (§4.1.1). It adds new
kernel- and hardware-backed virtual memory abstrac-
tions for intra-process isolation (§4.1.2, §4.1.3), and mod-
ifies other abstractions for enforcing DIFC within tradi-
tional kernel objects (§4.1.4).
4.1.1 Sirius security module
Our new Linux security module (LSM) implements one
set of clear rules for enforcing SWIT within any pri-
mary kernel objects such as inodes, tasks, IMCs,
and provides new security hooks (e.g., change_label,
check_flow_allowed) that are used in the rest of the
kernel to govern the information flow control. The LSM
initialises required data structures such as the label reg-
istry that caches labels and capability lists per threads.
We implemented a hash table-based registry to make op-
erations (store/set/get/remove) on these data structures
more efficient. The LSM also handles synchronisation for
labeling operations using mutexes and atomic operations.
The LSM stores labels and metadata required for en-
forcing DIFC in each thread’s cred structure, and modi-
fied copy_creds and copy_process to disallow cred in-
heritance by allocating an empty cred per thread. LSM’s
FS-specific hooks are used for managing inodes labels
and enforcing the safe flow within files and directories;
e.g. via the inode_permission and file_permission
security hooks. The LSM provides similar hooks for
DIFC enforcement within sockets and pipes, and IMCs.
4.1.2 MCA implementation
We extend the kernel to support efficient intra-process
address space isolation via the IMC abstraction. Each
IMC maintains a secrecy label and has a private page
global directory (pgd_t) that is loaded into the TTBR reg-
ister during a context switch. Each of these private page
tables can isolate vdoms as their permissions depend on
the mapped IMC as shown below:
struct vdom_struct {
int vdom_id;
struct mutex vdom_mutex;
struct vm_segment *vdom_range;
// operation bitmaps: set to 1 if imc[i]
//is allowed to do this operation , 0 OW
DECLARE_BITMAP(imc_Read , IMC_MAX);
DECLARE_BITMAP(imc_Write , IMC_MAX);
DECLARE_BITMAP(imc_Execute , IMC_MAX);
DECLARE_BITMAP(imc_Allocate , IMC_MAX); };
Threads in a process share the same mm_struct that
describes the process address space. Having separate
mm_struct for threads would significantly impact system
performance, as all the memory operations related to page
tables should maintain strict consistency. Instead, MCA
extends mm_struct to embed vdoms and IMC metadata
within it as lightweight regions in the same address space.
The pgd_imc struct stores a per-IMC pgd_t for threads,
and vdom_metadata and imc_metadata stores metadata
for memory managment and IMC.
The standard Linux kernel avoids reloading page tables
during a context switch if two tasks belong to the same
process. We modified check_and_switch_context to
reload IMC page tables and flush related TLB entries if
one of the switching threads owns an IMC. We further
mitigate the flushing overhead using tagged TLB features
and ARM memory domains (§4.1.3). We modify mmap.c
to keep track of mapped vdom memory ranges and extend
it with vdom_mmap/mumap operations.
The kernel handle_mm_fault handler is extended to
specially manage page faults in IMC regions, so an IMC
privilege violation results in the handler killing the vio-
lating thread. The extended mm_struct thus contains the
following extra metadata per process:
struct mm_struct {
...
#ifdef CONFIG_SW_MCA
atomic_t num_vdoms; /* number of vdoms */
atomic_t num_imc; /* number of imcs */
struct imc_struct *imc_metadata[IMC_MAX ];
struct vdom_struct *vdom_metadata[IMC_MAX ];
/*vdom Page tables per threads.*/
pgd_t *pgd_imc[IMC_MAX ];
DECLARE_BITMAP(imc_InUse , IMC_MAX);
DECLARE_BITMAP(vdom_InUse , IMC_MAX);
int curr_using_imc;
spinlock_t ptl_imc[IMC_MAX ];
struct mutex imc_metadataMutex;
#endif
... };
4.1.3 Hardware-backed MCA
We provide an optional optimization for our MCA
implementation by utilizing ARM memory domains
(MDs) [12] if supported by the hardware. ARM-MDs
are a lesser-known memory access control mechanism
that is independent of paging. Each page table first-level
entry has 4 bits allocated to support 16 memory domains.
Access control for each domain is handled by setting a
domain access control register (DACR) in CP15, which
is a 32-bit privileged register. Changing domain permis-
sions are low cost and do not require TLB flushes, and
any access violation causes a domain fault. The table
below shows the four possible access rights for a domain.
Mode Bits Description
No Access 00 Any access causes a domain fault.
Manager 11 Full accesses with no permissions check.
Client 01 Accesses are checked against page tables
Reserved 10 Unknown behaviour.
The optimised MCA maps vdoms to hardware do-
mains instead of separate page tables, and so supports
up to 16 1MB-aligned vdoms. Sirius provide a separate
set of kernel memory management functions similar to
their Linux equivalents (e.g., do_mmap, do_munmap and
do_mprotect) for mapping vdoms to hardware domains.
Due to the reduced number of TLB flushes and faster
context switches, using ARM-MDs improves the cost of
Sirius threading by 38% (§5.1). The hardware-backed
MCA improves the performance of vdom_mmap/munmap
by 48% due to the simpler mechanism of memory map-
ping to the memory domain instead of page tables. It also
improves the performance of vdom_mprotect (1.14x
faster than mprotect) if the requested permission change
matches one of the supported hardware options; other-
wise, the cost is the same as vdom_mprotect. The opti-
mised MCA also has a more lightweight fault handler
that utilise domain faults instead of full page faults.
4.1.4 Tracking flows within the kernel
We modified the VFS layer to enforce thread’s security
policies within all operations on inode, file, and VFS
address space objects; these kernel abstractions are used
to perform operations on unopened files and file handles
(including sockets and pipes). Most inode operations
(e.g., create, link, mknod, mkdir, permission) require
a lookup to find related inodes and dcaches; hence,
we modified the kernel namei to disallow unauthorized
information flow at early lookup stages.
We extended the open syscall with two new flags
(SLABEL and ILABEL) that a thread can use to cre-
ate a labelled file (e.g. O_CREAT | SLABEL) and added
file/inode_permission security hooks on necessary
places to disallow unauthorised file operations like
read/write/stat/seek. A malicious thread may also
try to map a labeled file to an address space object via
writepage. Sirius checks that labeled files are only be
mapped to IMCs with the right labels via vdom_mmap.
The label of an inode protects its contents and its meta-
data. In a typical filesystem tree, secrecy increases from
the root to the leaves. To ensure writing a new entry in a
parent directory does not disclose secret information, we
disallow a thread with secrecy label S{x} from creating a
file with the same secrecy label in an unlabelled directory
since it leaks information through the filename. The LSM
lets a thread with non-empty labels Sp, Ip create a labeled
file or directory with labels Sd , Id , if the label change is
safe and the thread can write to the parent directory with
its current label. Sirius stores normal files’ labels in the
extended attributes, or in the SM storage if the file is an
enclave-shared/owned object.
We also modified the kernel to enforce DIFC in socket
operations like create, listen, connect, sendmsg, and
recvmsg. This was done by placing security hooks in
those functions and at the end of the lookup process
(e.g., sockfd_lookup_light). All operations for unla-
belled threads and unlabelled objects follow the tradi-
tional Linux access control mechanisms, so applications
not using Sirius do not require any modifications. Sim-
ilarly, Sirius controls information flow within pipes, so
a thread may read or write to a pipe as long as its labels
are compatible. Sirius does not allow a labeled thread to
connect to a socket unless that thread has the declassifi-
cation capability for the accessed secrets. Messages that
cannot be delivered are rejected silently to avoid leaking
information by returning errors.
4.2 Secure World Kernel and Monitor
We extend OP-TEE V3.4 secure kernel and monitor
(optee_os), and the TEE driver (libTEEC) to enforce
DIFC within enclave threads, RPC messages, and shared
memory. The OP-TEE security model is based on Glob-
alPlatform [29] API parameter security checks. It checks
RPC messages by validating arguments, buffer sizes, and
directions flags at every layer of privilege (EL0, EL1, EL3,
SEL1, SEL0). However, these checks have been bypassed
many times [26]. For shared memory, OP-TEE checks
the address range, cache attributes, and size of allocated
memory chunks. This is also insufficient in many cases
(§2.1); for example, to avoid BOOMERANG attacks, the
authors extended OPTEE with the CSR-based pointer
verification [44]. Our security model is based on fine-
grained compartmentalisation and isolation rather than
error-prone security checks.
Security Monitor: We first modified the optee_os se-
curity monitor (core/sm), which is the entry point of
RPC messages between the two worlds and runs at the
highest privilege level. We extended the monitor to la-
bel each enclave, and store labels and capability lists in
sm_cred, a new data structure. IFC over RPC requests
is enforced by adding a security module similar to our
LSM (§4.1.1) to the SM. When an RPC is safe and leads
to label changes, the monitor transfers its sm_cred data
structure to the secure and normal worlds to each update
their thread labels accordingly.
Secure Kernel: The unmodified OP-TEE secure ker-
nel assigns a static number of threads for each enclave
(CFG_NUM_THREADS). Execution of enclave threads is tied
to the execution of the caller thread and scheduled by the
Linux kernel. The secure kernel uses several L1 transla-
tion tables (one spanning 4GB) and some smaller tables
spanning 32MB. The large translation table handles se-
cure kernel mappings (TTBR1), and the small tables are
assigned per thread and map enclave contexts to its dedi-
cated VM. We also extend the secure kernel to enforce
IFC within enclave threads, RPCs, and memory objects.
Enclave Userspace: We replaced the OP-TEE
shared memory mechanism with an IMC-assisted
one via new ioctl calls to the OP-TEE driver (e.g.,
TEE_IOC_SHM_SIRIUS_ALLOC). We also added support
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Figure 5: Overhead of Sirius-protected kernel objects
for the enclave-side versions of the MCA. Enclave
threads now benefit from the fine-grained shared memory
protection described in the Linux MCA (§4.1.2).
The original OPTEE supports a limited encrypted
storage mechanism using a (non-POSIX) interface to
the Linux filesystems. While useful for storing enclave-
related keys, it is impractical for applications with mod-
erate I/O requirements (§5.1). We extended OPTEE to
provide labeled access to the Linux FSs, allowing enclave
threads to control their files without high overhead.
5 Evaluation
We have so far explained how Sirius implements SWIT
to guard applications partitioned across normal and se-
cure worlds (§4). Sirius reduces the overhead of DIFC
significantly by: (i) enforcing and tracking labels in the
kernel abstractions rather than userspace; and (ii) adding
a new abstraction for address space compartmentalisa-
tion to achieve intra-process memory isolation (§4.1.3).
We next examine the impact of these choices, with mi-
crobenchmarks (§5.1) and poring applications (§5.2).
Our evaluation is done on Raspberry Pi 3 Model B [7]
with a 1.2 GHz 64-bit quad-core ARM Cortex-A53 pro-
cessor with 32KB L1 and 512KB L2 cache memory, run-
ning a 32-bit unmodified Linux kernel version 4.19.42
and glibc 2.28 as the baseline. We modified Linux to
implement SWIT within the normal world (§4.1). Our
kernel patch only adds ≈ 10K LoC, of which the Sirius
LSM (§4.1.1) is≈ 5.4K new LoC and the MCA modifies
≈ 2.5K LoC within the virtual memory layer (§4.1.2).
The hardware-backed MCA required fewer changes as
it bypassed much of the existing Linux code by using
hardware domains (§4.1.3). The remaining changes are
mostly done to VFS and networking layers (§4.1.4). We
extended OPTEE V3.4 to implement SWIT within the
secure world. Our modifications adds ≈ 2K LoC to the
security kernel and monitor, and ≈ 3K LoC to the TEE
driver and userspace API.
5.1 Microbenchmarks
What is the overhead of Sirius on a baseline Linux kernel?
How much does the Sirius LSM affect the performance
of general OS services such as filesystem, networking,
threading, and memory operations? How effective is the
use of hardware memory domains for optimizing MCA?
Linux: We used LMbench 3.0 [46] to evaluate the over-
all overhead of our Linux modifications compared to the
baseline kernel (Figure 5a). The results show that en-
abling Sirius on all file systems causes ≈ 1.2x slowdown.
Figure 5b shows that Sirius protection is ≈ 81x faster
than the OPTEE secure storage mechanism, which uses
a heavyweight forwarding mechanism to the Linux. The
Sirius labelling approach has reasonable overhead, and
makes it far easier to securely share resources across
the host application and enclave. Latency overhead is
≈ 0.7% on LMbench networking benchmarks.
Threading: We tested the cost of creating and joining
(using waitpid) Sirius threads using clone with the new
SLABEL flag that creates a secrecy-tagged thread. We also
run pthread and fork microbenchmarks on the baseline
kernel. The table below shows the average latency (µs)
of 100000 runs with 1MB and 2MB heap sizes.
Operation fork pthread s_clone hw s_clone
Launch (1MB) 280.24 31.17 51.80 31.98
Join (1MB) 832.45 1.10 3.78 1.70
Launch (2MB) 331.40 31.51 51.85 32.1
Join (2MB) 1126.69 1.13 3.82(3) 1.78
Forking is far more expensive than baseline threads
with shared address space. The Sirius threads are slower
than pthreads due to the overhead of our MCA-based
memory isolation, but with our hardware-backed MCA
optimization, Sirius threads add only 2.5% overhead com-
pare to pthreads. This highlights the importance of uti-
lizing HW-based VM tagging for optimizing MCA.
Enclave operations: Our changes to OP-TEE replaced
checks spread throughout it with SWIT-enabled enclave
operations that improves flexibility and performance. The
table below reports the average of 20000 runs of our mi-
crobenchmark that shows Sirius secure world is ≈ 8.3%
faster than unmodified OPTEE with baseline Linux.
Latency (µs)
OP-TEE Sirius SK
create enclave 99.82±0.02 93.95±0.01
delete enclave 30.02±0.01 30.10±0.01
enclave calls (ecall ocall) 22.68±0.01 20.14±0.03
Memory allocation: We next test our memory com-
partmentalisation overhead, first for shared mem-
ory allocation. We test baseline OP-TEE, and the
BOOMERANG [44] CSR code that adds additional
pointer verification to OP-TEE, with our IMC-based ap-
proach. The following results show that Sirius shared
memory protection outperforms both by ≈ 16% and
≈ 31%. respectively, while providing stronger and thread-
granularity address space isolation.
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512
0
5
10
15
Allocated Memory (KB)
L
at
en
cy
(µ
s)
OPTEE OPTEE-CSR Sirius
Memory protection: We measure the cost of mem-
ory protection for baseline Linux where protection is
per-process, and on Sirius threads where protection is
per-thread and either implemented in software (§4.1.2)
or hardware (§4.1.3). The next graph shows the average
results of 10000 runs of our microbenchmark compar-
ing the cost of vdom_mprotect with mprotect on base-
line kernel. The results show vdom_mprotect is 1.12x
slower than mprotect, but the hardware-backed Sirius
vdom_mprotect is 1.14x faster than baseline for some
permissions (none and r/w) that supported by DACR regis-
ter and do not need a TLB flush (§4.1.3).
5.2 Protecting Applications with Sirius
Sirius aims to make the usage of TEE systems more
widespread in conventional applications, as well as im-
prove the security of existing TEE-assisted applications.
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We chose three applications to comprehensively adapt
to the Sirius APIs. Firstly, the popular Apache httpd can
be adapted to run with reasonable overhead under Sirius
(§5.2.1). Then we port two popular TEE-assisted appli-
cations – a machine learning framework (§5.2.2) and
DDS-based control system (§5.2.3), and show how our
system-wide isolation improves their security and perfor-
mance at the same time. Figure 3 illustrates the ported
architecture of all three applications.
5.2.1 Apache httpd and OpenSSL
We earlier described the architecture of the enclave-
protected httpd in Sirius (§3). We built a TEE-assisted
OpenSSL using two enclaves, and only modified ≈ 2.4K
LoC out of ≈ 533K LoC. The ported httpd protects all
private keys, session keys, and certificates and operations
on them from any unauthorized thread by defining SWIT-
based trust boundaries in both normal and enclave worlds.
It forbids a malicious enclave thread from transferring
secrets through uncontrolled channels to another enclave,
or via untrusted memory, or via a file or networking sock-
ets. A malicious httpd worker thread cannot compromise
the enclave by crafting RPC requests or modifying shared
memory or even by gaining root privilege2 unless also
compromising the host kernel and security monitor to
obtain the right labels. It also provides in-depth mutually
distrustful isolation of stored data, metadata, and binaries
on the host filesystem for both enclaves and httpd.
We modified OpenSSL libcrypto to support a
protected heap via a shared IMC owned by our
EVP_enclave. All the data structures that store pri-
vate keys (EVP_PKEY) now use the Sirius vdoms
memory operations such as vdom_malloc/free that
is replace with original CRYPTO_malloc/free. The
EVP_enclave thread is the owner of this protected
heap. Sirius protects the secrets that are being pro-
cessed in this memory region, usually via cryptogra-
phy operations such as EVP_Encrypt/DecryptUpdate
or pkey_rsa_encrypt/decrypt. The main httpd thread
grants the plus capability to the EVP_enclave for com-
munication with the storage_enclave to store encrypted
2See CVE-2019-0211 or CVE-2019-0217, among others.
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Figure 6: Overhead of Sirius-assisted httpd
content, keys, and certificates inside storage that is la-
beled to be hidden from other threads. The EVP_enclave
thread is also the owner of all the OpenSSL files and
directories (e.g., OPENSSLDIR) to restrict unauthorised or
accidental information leaks.
Figure 6 shows the overhead of ApacheBench applied
against the original OpenSSL library on a baseline ker-
nel and the Sirius-assisted httpd. ApacheBench ran with
a timeline of 5 minutes for each request size, with the
TLS1.2 DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 algorithm cipher
suite. The results show that Sirius-enabled httpd adds
≈ 10.8% overhead on multithreading benchmark. This
is a very reasonable overhead for an application that now
gains fine-grained isolation with defense-in-depth layers
to protect its secrets against threats from both the normal
and secure world, which was not possible without Sirius.
5.2.2 Privacy-preserving ML
TEE-assisted ML frameworks such as DarkneTZ [48]
are designed to avoid membership inference attacks
(MIA) [65] against ML models and training data [33, 58,
74]. We modified DarkneTZ to protect it against attacks
that require even finer-grained compartmentalisation.
Darknet is a heavily multithreaded application that
launches many threads for training and processing sensi-
tive data that could potentially misbehave. Sirius ensures
that only authorised threads can issue queries to the en-
clave, providing another layer of protection against MIA
attacks. Sirius labels the ML models stored in the host
filesystem to be hidden from any untrusted thread and
restricts enclaves from transferring the models or any
processing data to untrusted sources.
We ported OPTEE-based DarkneTZ to Sirius with only
minor modifications (318 LoC) to provide full-system
security guarantees. We modified the Darknet classifier
(classifier.c) to launch secrecy-tagged threads for
communicating with enclave layers and used regular
threads for the rest of the data loading logic. We utilized
Sirius-guarded RPC and shared memory operations, and
protected all sensitive resources such as config (/cfg),
models (/models), and data (/data) on the host OS.
We evaluated the performance using AlexNet, which
has five convolutional layers. We train a model with
four layers outside and one layer inside an enclave using
CIFAR-100 [37] for both training and inference. CIFAR-
100 includes 50k training and 10k test images belonging
to 100 classes. The table below shows the Sirius overhead
compared to OP-TEE and the baseline when all layers
run in the normal world.
Operation Baseline Sirius OPTEE
training 75234 µs 78486 µs 85354 µs
pre-trained 68753 µs 73987 µs 76453 µs
inference 33.23 µs 36.32 µs 38.45 µs
Sirius outperforms OPTEE-based DarkneTZ by ≈
5.6% and on average adds ≈ 9.2% overhead compare
to baseline Darknet, despite the improved layers of isola-
tion and amount of data flowing across the normal and
secure worlds.
5.2.3 Secure DDS
Security-sensitive IoT applications such as autonomous
vehicles or medical devices use TEE-assisted data de-
livery service (e.g., ARM LibDDSSec) enclaves for
security-critical tasks. Sirius hardens LibDDSSec han-
dlers for authentication, protecting data samples, secret
sharing, and certificate operations, which all require se-
cure interactions with the normal world. The changes
ensure that all shared data from other nodes are protected
while being processed (via IMC) and while at rest (via
labeled files). Only trusted threads can exchange safety-
sensitive messages, control messages, critical system data
(e.g. emergency start/stop), and sensor data (e.g. temper-
ature, laser, camera).
We modified dsec_ca.c to replace the OPTEE RPC
and shared memory with Sirius-protected operations.
Sirius restricts any node from leaking private content
ha
nd
sh
ak
e
DH
ide
nti
ty_
ha
nd
le
ide
nti
ty_
ce
rt
ide
nti
ty_
PK
ses
sio
n_
ke
y
sh
are
d_
sec
ret
ae
s_
op
s
ma
na
ge
_o
bje
ct
ke
y_
ma
ter
ial
ch
all
en
ge
s
ca
na
ry
101
103
105
L
at
en
cy
(m
s)
OP-TEE Sirius
through uncontrolled channels by labelling associated
sockets and files. We evaluate the overhead using the
OPTEE-enabled LibDDSSec benchmarks that show Sir-
ius improves the overhead by 0.05%.
6 Related Work & Discussion
Our goal with building Sirius has been to understand how
to securely integrate TEE hardware, which is now preva-
lent in modern systems, on conventional OSs. Existing
solutions have explored some aspects, but have not con-
sidered system-wide isolation for complex applications.
They have often been missing defense-in-depth, and one
attack breaks through the TEE protections and results in
data compromise (§1).
TEE systems: There are several TEE systems such as
Intel’s SGXSDK [23], Microsoft’s Open Enclave [24],
Komodo [27], Google’s Asylo [30], OP-TEE [6], Sanctu-
ary [52], and Keystone [39] that enable enclave-assisted
computations. Also, in-enclave LibOSs [13, 15, 70] ports
a large portion of OS personality inside enclaves for
running unmodified applications entirely to enclaves. En-
claveDom [47] utilizes Intel MPK to provide memory
isolation within such monolithic in-enclave LibOSs, and
MPTEE [87] uses Intel MPX for providing protected
shared memory for SGX enclave-enabled applications.
SGXJail [80] uses process-based isolation and syscall
filtering [8] for sandboxing enclave malware. Despite im-
proving the security of applications, these systems are not
considering the large attack surface that Sirius defends
against (§2.1). Sirius is the first OS and TEE system that
offer collaborative system-wide isolation at both inter-
and intra-process levels, so applications can architect var-
ious layers of defense both in normal and enclave worlds
via principled approach.
OS-assisted solutions: Providing isolation is histor-
ically one of the main jobs of OSs. There are vari-
ous techniques for compartmentalisation using process-
based isolation [18,20], namespaces [3–5,53], capability-
based privilege seperation [19, 43, 64, 77], mandatory
access controls (MACs) [43, 82], and system call filter-
ing [8]. Despite working well for protecting the host OS,
they are not designed to protect multiple independent
and mutually untrusting kernels running, as is the case
in the TEEs. Sirius is the first system to work along-
side these in Linux and without large per-process pro-
tection overhead [38, 75] or reliance on a specific lan-
guage [57]. Many systems provide intra-process mem-
ory protection [16, 28, 32, 42, 71, 76]. Our MCA of-
fers efficient intra-process isolation as a part of Sirius’s
system-wide compartmentalisation goals. DIFC-based
systems [38, 75, 85, 85], and in particular HiStar [84], in-
spired our work; However, these systems are not designed
to achieve Sirius’s goals for providing system-wide com-
partmentalisation in TEE systems on conventional OSs.
Our experience with building Sirius has shown a sweet
spot for the adoption of DIFC as the core of our SWIT
model to enable mutually-distrustful isolation between
trusted and untrusted worlds; this allows both worlds to
combine their features without leaking information. How-
ever, this was not practical without (i) our kernel exten-
sions to reduce the overhead of labeling within Linux ker-
nel abstractions, and in particular, within address space
objects; and (i) our APIs to hide the underlying com-
plexities that allow our ported applications to gain many
layers of protection and very natural integration with
Linux programming facilities.
When porting applications to Sirius, we learned two
important lessons on the usability of Sirius: Firstly, since
DIFC works best when a clean definition of trust bound-
aries is possible. The right set of APIs that enables appli-
cations with simple compartmentalisation and seamless
labeling, such as our extension to existing kernel syscalls,
plays a significant role in adopting complex applications.
In particular, in TEE systems, a typical target applica-
tion already has a relatively clear sense of its secrets (for
example, private keys or data models) to isolate inside en-
claves, as well as its coarse-grained trusted and untrusted
partitions; this is a perfect match for defining even more
powerful trust boundaries. Secondly, it turned out to be
straightforward to compartmentalise security-sensitive
memory pieces of TEE-assisted applications using our
intra-process MCA. For instance, after partitioning en-
clave and untrusted components, we only needed one
or two IMCs for shared memory and another IMC for
isolating the rest of the application from its enclaves. In
our experience, we never needed more than 16 IMCs,
so we could gain the performance advantages of our
hardware-backed MCA support that utilizes hardware
memory domains for VMA tagging.
7 Conclusion
We have presented Sirius, the first system that establishes
system-wide isolation by enforcing fine-grained infor-
mation flow control within enclaves and kernel objects.
Sirius provides a pragmatic solution by selectively ex-
tending the Linux kernel and introducing new abstrac-
tions where needed. We have ported applications to Sirius
that would otherwise not have fully benefited from TEE
hardware, and also shown both performance and security
improvements in existing TEE-assisted applications.
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